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REGULATORY HORCRUXES 
SARAH E. LIGHT† 
ABSTRACT 
  The regulator that designs and first implements a federal regulatory 
program does not always have the ability to control the timing and 
process of how that regulatory program will, in this Symposium’s 
language, “exit.” As the 2016 election has demonstrated, the initiating 
regulator cannot necessarily plan in advance for the program’s 
expiration, diminution, or scaling back. A successor instead wields this 
power. Whether one views this as a terrible thing or a salutary feature 
of democracy depends in part upon one’s relationship to the regulatory 
status quo, but also implicates broader questions about policy stability 
and democratic accountability. At the very least, however, this fact 
raises several important questions about strategic regulatory design. 
First, is it possible to insulate or harden regulatory programs from 
successor exit? And second, when, if ever, would this be a good thing? 
This Article offers a systematic account of how regulators can make 
regulatory exit more challenging by looking outward, beyond the walls 
of a single, primary federal agency to other potential regulators or co-
regulators, including secondary federal agencies, the states, and private 
actors. 
  This Article identifies as a potential antidote to regulatory exit a 
constellation of strategic techniques that I call regulatory horcruxes—
much like the horcruxes Lord Voldemort created by placing portions 
of his soul into multiple external objects in order to ensure his 
immortality.1 An initiating regulator, be it Congress or a federal agency, 
can use such horcruxes in an effort to make successor exit more difficult 
by splitting programs beyond the walls of a single federal agency into 
other institutions. This Article first offers an analytical framework 
laying out five primary types of horcrux. It then examines horcruxes 
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from a normative perspective, evaluating the comparative benefits and 
costs of their use in terms of their potential impact both on the 
durability of regulatory programs and on the quality of democratic 
deliberation. It acknowledges that horcruxes are an imperfect solution. 
Although dispersal or fragmentation of regulatory authority may 
insulate a program from deregulatory pressure, the fragmented 
regulatory program may exist in a weakened form that cannot 
accomplish as much as more direct, centralized regulation can. The 
Article concludes by offering a research agenda, including suggestions 
for further empirical research. 
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INTRODUCTION 
J.B. Ruhl and Jim Salzman have called for legislators and 
regulators to think more comprehensively about regulatory “exit,” 
which they define as “the intentional, significant reduction in 
governmental intervention initiated at a particular time under specified 
processes and conditions.”2 They offer a taxonomy of different types 
 
 2. J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Regulatory Exit, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1302 (2015) 
(emphasis omitted). Exit includes not only complete termination of a program, but other, less 
drastic steps, such as diminution or scaling back of a program, or reducing the number of 
beneficiary classes, for example. Id. For the seminal theoretical account of exit, see ALBERT O. 
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of exit, ranging from one embedded into a regulatory program ex ante 
with concrete and transparent legal rules either for the government or 
a party to exit, to a “messy” form, which occurs ex post and lacks such 
clear rules.3 Normatively, exit is good if regulatory goals have been 
achieved, or if scarce resources could be better devoted to other 
problems; however, exit is problematic if there remains work to be 
done.4 They conclude that initiating “legislatures and agencies should 
explicitly consider exit at the creation of new regulatory programs.”5 
No matter what kind of exit strategy initiating regulators build into 
a specific regulatory program ex ante, however, there always remains 
the possibility that a successor administration will exit based on 
background legal rules.6 In other words, despite Ruhl and Salzman’s 
useful framework and prescriptive conclusion, even if a statute or 
regulatory scheme clearly spells out all of the conditions for exit in 
advance, certain background legal rules exist that permit a successor to 
end or amend a regulatory program. Congress can repeal or amend a 
statute pursuant to Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution.7 An agency 
 
HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, 
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970). The concept of regulatory exit is distinct from the idea, 
elaborated upon by Charles Tiebout, that a mobile citizenry has the power to “exit” one 
jurisdiction and move to another when policies are adopted that do not meet the citizen’s 
preferences. Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 
(1956).  
 3. Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 2, at 1302–03.  
 4. Id. at 1309–11.  
 5. Id. at 1325.  
 6. This question of fidelity to the enacting coalition’s wishes is central to the so-called 
delegation problem within administrative law, namely the tension between the delegation of 
authority to agencies whose personnel are unelected and the exercise of political control by 
elected principals in Congress and the president. Although the literature addressing this tension 
is too voluminous to cite, for a few examples discussing these issues both theoretically and 
empirically, see generally Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, 
Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243 (1987) 
[hereinafter McNollgast, Administrative Procedures]; Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & 
Barry R. Weingast, Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and 
the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431 (1989) [hereinafter, McNollgast, Structure 
and Process]; David B. Spence, Managing Delegation Ex Ante: Using Law to Steer Administrative 
Agencies, 28 J. LEG. STUD. 413 (1999) (noting a lack of empirical testing of the “structure and 
process” theory). This question also arises in the literature on “coalitional drift,” which examines 
“the influence of subsequent political coalitions on the development and administration of the 
law.” Murray J. Horn & Kenneth A. Shepsle, Commentary on “Administrative Arrangements and 
the Political Control of Agencies”: Administrative Process and Organizational Form as Legislative 
Responses to Agency Costs, 75 VA. L. REV. 499, 499 (1989) (distinguishing coalitional drift from 
the bureaucratic drift that is central to the delegation problem). For further discussion on these 
two forms of drift, see infra notes 14–17 and accompanying text.  
 7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
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can repeal or amend a regulation pursuant to the notice-and-comment 
procedures set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act.8 If the 
regulation is recent enough, Congress and the president can revoke it 
pursuant to the Congressional Review Act (CRA).9 And there are 
numerous informal ways to reduce program resources, including by 
slashing agency budgets, reassigning staff, declining to enforce a 
regulatory program, or seeking delays in the courts.10 Of course, there 
are both legal and political costs associated with these types of 
deregulatory actions. But these formal and informal background 
mechanisms nonetheless exist, and therefore must be accounted for in 
any theory of exit. 
This potential for successor exit raises a set of complex questions. 
First, against the backdrop of these default legal rules, is it possible to 
insulate or harden a regulatory program against premature successor 
exit? Second, when, if ever, would such insulation be a good thing?11 
Some scholars have examined the strategies that federal agencies can 
employ internally to insulate their actions from presidential, 
congressional, or judicial control during particular phases of political 
cycles, such as in the lame duck period after an election.12 Others have 
 
 8. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. v. 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 41 (1983). 
 9. See Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 801–808 (2012) (granting Congress a 60-day 
period in which to review rulemakings and pass a joint resolution of disapproval, which, with 
presidential signature, not only repeals an existing rule, but also purports to preclude the agency 
from promulgating a rule in the future on the same subject matter). Prior to the 2016 election, the 
CRA had been used only once. In the first months of the Trump administration, the CRA was 
used fourteen times to overturn regulations adopted at the end of the Obama administration. Of 
those fourteen regulations, four related to energy and the environment. Three were regulations 
adopted by the Department of Interior (DOI) relating to resource management planning, 
wildlife, and stream protection. One was a regulation of the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) requiring the disclosure of payments to foreign governments by entities involved in 
resource extraction. Congressional Review Act FAQs, GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., 
https://www.gao.gov/legal/congressional-review-act/faq [https://perma.cc/32ZR-V5NU]. 
 10. See Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the 
Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 1156 (2009) (“[W]hat Congress and the 
President give, they can just as easily take away.”); Jonathan Remy Nash, J.B. Ruhl & James 
Salzman, The Production Function of the Regulatory State: How Much Do Agency Budgets 
Matter?, 102 MINN. L. REV. 695 (2017) (noting that the Trump administration proposed to slash 
the budget of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) by 25 percent).  
 11. Cf. Lazarus, supra note 10, at 1158, 1206 (arguing that laws addressing climate change 
should be designed to include asymmetric “‘precommitment strategies’ that deliberately make it 
hard (but never impossible) to change the law” in an anti-environmental direction in response to 
short-term economic or other interest group pressures (footnote omitted)).  
 12. See Nina A. Mendelson, Agency Burrowing: Entrenching Policies and Personnel Before 
a New President Arrives, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 557, 589–93, 606–10 (2003) (examining techniques 
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examined how institutional design—for example, the design of 
independent agencies—can insulate them from short-term interest 
group capture to promote long-term public welfare based on 
expertise.13 The “structure and process” thesis of Matthew McCubbins, 
Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast (McNollgast) posits that Congress 
uses authorizing legislation ex ante to embed structures and procedures 
into agency decisionmaking in ways that can favor substantive 
outcomes.14 In other words, regulatory and legislative design can 
“stack[] the deck” in favor of the coalition that enacted the original 
regulatory program and against “bureaucratic drift.”15 Murray Horn, 
Jonathan Macey, and Kenneth Shepsle expand this logic, arguing that 
an enacting coalition must be mindful of shifting preferences not only 
within the agency vis-à-vis the enacting coalition, but also of the 
shifting preferences of political actors outside the agency.16 In their 
 
including midnight rulemaking, hiring, and promotions before a presidential transition); Jennifer 
Nou, Agency Self-Insulation Under Presidential Review, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1755, 1782–1803 
(2013) (examining strategies that allow agencies to increase the cost of presidential review when 
agency and presidential preferences diverge); Anne Joseph O’Connell, Agency Rulemaking and 
Political Transitions, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 471, 474–75 (2011) (empirically examining agency 
rulemaking in the face of presidential, congressional, and judicial transitions). Notably, Richard 
Lazarus offers menus of both internal design strategies and some external ones to create 
asymmetric precommitments favoring climate policy. See Lazarus, supra note 10, at 1206, 1209–
31 (suggesting “interagency, scientific advisory, and stakeholder consultation requirements . . . ; 
statutory and regulatory hammers . . . ; federal preemption and non-preemption triggers . . . ; and 
limited and enhanced judicial review provisions” among others (emphasis omitted)). 
 13. See Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional 
Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 18–19 (2010) (noting that the problem of capture by one-sided interest 
group pressure exists in many policy areas, and focusing on consumer protection); McNollgast, 
Administrative Procedures, supra note 6, at 253–64; McNollgast, Structure and Process, supra note 
6, at 435–45; Spence, supra note 6, at 415–16 (discussing structure and process hypothesis); cf. 
David E. Lewis, The Adverse Consequences of the Politics of Agency Design for Presidential 
Management in the United States: The Relative Durability of Insulated Agencies, 34 BRIT. J. POL. 
SCI. 377, 379 (2004) (concluding that independent agencies are effectively insulated from 
presidential control and will have a longer expected duration). 
 14. See McNollgast, Structure and Process, supra note 6, at 435–45. 
 15. See McNollgast, Administrative Procedures, supra note 6, at 253–64; McNollgast, 
Structure and Process, supra note 6, at 435–45. But see David B. Spence, Administrative Law and 
Agency Policy-Making: Rethinking the Positive Theory of Political Control, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 
407, 424–25 (1997) (arguing that the procedural control arguments are “weak” because empirical 
studies have demonstrated that opponents of the “enacting coalition” can likewise benefit from 
neutral procedures like notice and comment). 
 16. Horn & Shepsle, supra note 6, at 499 (arguing that managing coalitional drift and 
bureaucratic drift involves tradeoffs); Jonathan Macey, Organizational Design and the 
Administrative Control of Agencies, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 93, 93–94, 108–09 (1992) (questioning 
the significance of the tradeoff between bureaucratic and coalitional drift, and arguing that both 
can be addressed through design of “who an agency represents,” such as through the creation of 
a “a single-industry regulatory agency,” or through inter-agency competition over jurisdiction); 
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view, the enacting coalition must guard not only against “bureaucratic 
drift,” which is the classic principal-agent problem that agency 
bureaucrats will stray from the principal’s wishes when implementing 
policy, but also against “coalitional drift,” namely “the influence of 
subsequent political coalitions on the development and administration 
of the law.”17 It is the latter concern that is more salient in the context 
of a new, deregulatory coalition. 
This Article closely examines what happens when regulators and 
legislators look outward beyond the walls of a single, primary federal 
agency to embed features of regulatory programs, or entire programs, 
in other potential regulators or co-regulators: other federal agencies, 
the states, and private, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). It 
identifies a constellation of techniques—regulatory horcruxes—that 
have the potential to render successor exit more challenging through 
decentralization or fragmentation of regulatory authority. It then 
examines the comparative benefits and costs of their use.18 These 
 
Kenneth A. Shepsle, Bureaucratic Drift, Coalitional Drift, and Time Consistency: A Comment on 
Macey, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 111, 114–15 (1992) (arguing that the enacting coalition seeks to 
optimize the balance between protecting against each of these types of drift).  
 17. Horn & Shepsle, supra note 6, at 499, 503 (noting that the enacting coalition “cannot 
constrain private interests and future coalitions from tampering with an enacted agreement”).  
 18. This Article thus builds and expands upon legal scholarship examining the extent to 
which regulatory programs that are shared across multiple federal agencies or embedded within 
secondary agencies, and situations in which agencies can “check and balance” one another’s 
decisions under different regulatory programs, are more “durable” than other regulatory 
programs or promote other values like better decisionmaking. These studies tend to focus on 
shared regulatory space or regulatory redundancy across multiple agencies within the federal 
government. E.g., Todd S. Aagaard, Environmental Law Outside the Canon, 89 IND. L.J. 1239, 
1264 (2014) (discussing “embedded” environmental law as programs with environmental goals 
housed in federal agencies other than the EPA); Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination 
in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1135 (2012) (focusing on coordination 
challenges of shared regulatory space across federal agencies and advocating presidential 
control); Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous 
Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2317 (2006) (focusing on “checks and balances” across 
federal agencies in the foreign affairs context); Jean-Jacques Laffont & David Martimort, 
Separation of Regulators Against Collusive Behavior, 30 RAND J. ECON. 232, 233–34, 257 (1999) 
(arguing, based on economic modeling, that “[t]he separation of regulators may be an optimal 
organizational response to the threat of capture,” but focusing on different regulatory programs 
housed in different agencies rather than single regulatory programs); Louis J. Sirico, Jr., Agencies 
in Conflict: Overlapping Agencies and the Legitimacy of the Administrative Process, 33 VAND. L. 
REV. 101, 101, 102 n.3, 113 (1980) (discussing three types of redundancy across federal agencies, 
including “blockage, policy interference, and advocacy”); cf. Daphna Renan, Pooling Powers, 115 
COLUM. L. REV. 211, 215 (2015) (discussing the informal “pooling” of power across federal 
agencies in practice, rather than in formal authority). Regulatory horcruxes include not only 
programs shared or split into different federal agencies, but also programs shared or split with the 
states and with private actors. In addition, by examining not only shared or overlapping regulatory 
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questions of strategic institutional design are especially timely in the 
context of the expressly deregulatory stance of both the Trump 
administration and the 115th Congress, with their strong focus on 
reducing environmental, energy, climate, and natural resource 
management standards adopted and enforced by the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), the Department of Energy (DOE), the 
Department of Transportation (DOT), the Department of Interior 
(DOI), and its subcabinet agencies like the Bureau of Land 
Management (BLM).19 Because regulatory programs addressing the 
environment are the subject of deep divides across partisan lines, and 
those federal agencies whose missions are environmental, energy, or 
natural resources related are currently in the crosshairs of recent and 
ongoing deregulatory efforts,20 the Article examines the concept of 
horcruxes through the lens of regulatory programs that affect the 
environment.21 And because the primary agency addressing 
 
space, but also regulatory programs that have been fully externalized into secondary federal 
agencies and the states with only the threat of their destruction remaining in the central regulator, 
the horcrux concept broadens this discussion about regulatory design. Identifying horcruxes as a 
single constellation of techniques allows for comparisons of the different forms along common 
normative dimensions. 
 19. Climate Deregulation Tracker, SABIN CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE L., 
http://columbiaclimatelaw.com/resources/climate-deregulation-tracker/all-updates 
[https://perma.cc/BUE3-ZJ8X] (compiling a list of deregulatory actions in the environmental and 
energy space taken since January 2017); see also Nadja Popovich & Livia Albeck-Ripka, 60 
Environmental Rules on the Way Out Under Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/10/05/climate/trump-environment-rules-reversed.html
?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/9Z6F-89PG]. 
 20. The Trump administration has disbanded scientific advisory committees, notified the 
international community of the intent of the United States to withdraw from the Paris Agreement 
on Climate Change, issued a proposed rule to repeal the Clean Power Plan, and taken other steps 
such as issuing executive orders to reduce regulatory “burdens” like environmental reviews for 
infrastructure projects. Agencies including the EPA, the DOE, the DOT, and others have frozen, 
delayed, or withdrawn energy efficiency and renewable fuel standards, announced their intention 
to revisit vehicle emissions standards, and begun to undertake other deregulatory actions, 
especially with respect to climate change. See Climate Deregulation Tracker, supra note 19. Many 
scholars have noted that environmental and climate change legislation and regulation are both 
difficult to pass and likely to be the subject of deregulatory pressure because regulators and 
members of the public are subject to cognitive biases that lead us to prioritize reducing immediate, 
monetizable costs in the short-run, rather than hard-to-monetize, diffuse harms in the future, 
among other biases. Lazarus, supra note 10, at 1173–79 (discussing myopia bias, among other 
biases in the climate context); David A. Dana, A Behavioral Economic Defense of the 
Precautionary Principle, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1315, 1316, 1320 (2003) (same). 
 21. Although this analysis focuses on environmental regulatory programs, the concept of 
regulatory horcruxes has broader salience. For example, regulatory horcruxes can exist for other 
areas of the law including human rights, civil rights, consumer protection, and employment 
protections, among others.  
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environmental programs is often, though not always, the EPA, I use 
the “EPA” throughout this Article as a shorthand for a primary federal 
agency with an expressly environmental mission. 
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I 
introduces an analytical framework that identifies five types of 
horcrux. It also answers the basic questions about who can employ 
them and at what stage in a regulatory program’s lifecycle they can be 
employed. It offers examples of horizontal horcruxes, vertical 
horcruxes, and private horcruxes: regulatory programs in which a 
secondary federal agency, the states, or private actors, respectively, 
play a role. These types are not necessarily exclusive, as hybrid forms 
exist. Part II then asks the basic normative question—why create a 
horcrux? What policy goals does it potentially serve and disserve? 
These instruments can potentially increase the durability of regulatory 
programs against the threat of successor exit through dispersal of 
regulatory authority. Horcruxes may likewise improve the chance of a 
program’s durability through increased democratic deliberation. By 
requiring those initiating regulatory programs to engage with multiple 
audiences and justify their programs in terms of broader values than 
mere “environmental” protection, they are more likely to be defended 
in the future by different, crosscutting constituencies and interest 
groups. Yet horcruxes have disadvantages as well, even for those who 
might benefit from their deployment. They may increase the costs of 
creating a program, and the decentralization may weaken the 
regulatory program. Combining these insights yields the Article’s 
hypothesis that policies that are fragmented across institutions far 
enough from the center to harden them against deregulatory pressure 
may be imperfectly embedded or may be weaker at achieving 
regulatory goals than direct, centralized regulation. Part III raises key 
empirical questions, and concludes by offering an agenda for further 
research.  
A few takeaways are worth noting here. First, the Article’s 
primary analytical contribution to the literature on strategic regulatory 
design is viewing these horcruxes as a single phenomenon. This 
generates a comparative hypothesis that a greater degree of 
fragmentation away from centralization in a single federal agency 
better insulates horcruxes from deregulatory pressure directed at the 
center. However, fragmentation can simultaneously weaken 
institutional power to achieve regulatory goals. Horizontal horcruxes 
that involve co-regulation by federal agencies are the most centralized 
form, and likely retain the most regulatory power. For example, these 
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may best address problems of nationwide scope or interstate spillovers. 
Yet horizontal horcruxes are simultaneously likely to be the weakest 
at resisting deregulatory pressure. Private horcruxes may fare best at 
resisting deregulatory pressure because private actors are not 
answerable to the same public constituencies as federal agencies. Yet 
private horcruxes may have less power to address national problems. 
And private enforcement may be stymied by standing limitations in the 
courts. The middle option, vertical horcruxes, in which the states or 
local governments play a role in a regulatory program, may strike the 
best balance between the degree of insulation and retention of power. 
Second, although the horcrux analogy is a useful heuristic, it is 
imperfect. For example, unlike the inanimate external objects used by 
Lord Voldemort as mere receptacles for portions of his soul, the 
relevant secondary institutions for regulatory horcruxes—federal 
agencies, the states, and private actors—are not inanimate objects.22 
They are institutions with their own leaders and stakeholders. Thus, 
action by the initiating federal regulator may create the necessary 
conditions for a horcrux, but with respect to both vertical and private 
horcruxes, mere action by the center may not be sufficient. Creating a 
horcrux in the regulatory context is a two-step process that requires not 
only action by the federal government, but also further action by the 
states or private actors to fully animate the horcrux. 
I.  A FRAMEWORK FOR HORCRUXES 
This Part systematically explores the central descriptive 
characteristics of horcruxes, including what a horcrux is, the five 
primary types of horcrux, who can create each kind of horcrux, and 
when such horcruxes can be created. 
A. What Is a Regulatory Horcrux? 
The term “horcrux,” familiar to any reader of the Harry Potter 
series, refers to the external objects into which the villain Lord 
Voldemort placed portions of his soul in an effort to achieve 
immortality.23 Splitting one’s soul into horcruxes operates as a means 
of self-preservation from attack: “Even if one’s body is attacked or 
destroyed, one cannot die, for part of the soul remains earthbound and 
 
 22. See infra note 37 and accompanying text.  
 23. ROWLING, supra note 1, at 497.  
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undamaged.”24 The concept of a horcrux is thus consistent with the 
notion that decentralization or fragmentation can be protective against 
threats to a centrally organized system. The separation of powers 
among the executive, legislature, and judiciary ensures that there are 
centers of power outside any one branch of the federal government. 
Our federal constitutional structure also guarantees that too much 
power is not concentrated in the hands of the federal government vis-
à-vis the states, but rather is fragmented across different regulators. 
Decentralization or fragmentation can be technological as well as 
political. For example, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has 
invested extensively in the creation of microgrids, which are local 
sources of distributed energy generation, to insulate its operations 
from disruption if the electric power grid is attacked.25 And though it 
would be impossible to conclude that everyone who helped to create 
the internet shared a single rationale for its decentralized structure, one 
argument for its lack of a single, central hub was that it could “surviv[e] 
a nuclear attack.”26 Other, more mundane examples of “fragmentation 
as insulation” abound, from the method the fast-food chain KFC uses 
to protect its secret recipe by dividing the recipe’s production among 
different suppliers, each of whom knows only a portion of the 
ingredients,27 to the basic principle of diversifying one’s investment 
portfolio to reduce risk. Insulation through fragmentation is not 
uniformly beneficial, however, depending upon one’s perspective. For 
example, the rise of decentralized networks of terrorist cells has made 
it more difficult for the United States to combat such organizations as 
compared to more conventional national forces, and has increased 
their unpredictability, anonymity, and effectiveness.28 The value of 
fragmentation also runs up against concerns about power. The two are 
likely to exist in an inverse relationship. Returning to the horcrux 
analogy, Lord Voldemort’s humanity was diminished when his soul 
 
 24. Id. 
 25. SCOTT B. VAN BROEKHOVEN, NICHOLAS JUDSON, S. V. T. NGUYEN & WILLIAM ROSS, 
MICROGRID STUDY: ENERGY SECURITY FOR DOD INSTALLATIONS 1 (2012), https://www.serdp-
estcp.org/News-and-Events/News-Announcements/Program-News/Microgrid-Study-Energy-
Security-for-DoD-Installations [https://perma.cc/NQ88-Y6MP]. 
 26. WALTER ISAACSON, THE INNOVATORS 250–51 (2014) (quoting Vint Cerf, one of the 
creators of ARPANET).  
 27. Corporate Espionage: Secrets and Lies, BRAND STRATEGY, Oct. 9, 2006, at 25.  
 28. Nicholas B. Pace, Decentralization: The Future of ISIS, SMALL WARS J. (Nov. 5, 2014), 
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/decentralization-the-future-of-isis [https://perma.cc/9YYB-
MZM4]. 
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was fragmented into pieces.29 And ultimately, both the horcruxes and 
Lord Voldemort were destroyed. Fragmentation’s benefits for 
insulation from attack may come at the expense of the power that 
derives from centralization. 
By viewing this constellation of strategies together, this Article 
builds on prior scholarship discussing how regulatory programs can 
exist in shared regulatory space across multiple federal agencies or be 
embedded in an agency other than the natural primary regulatory 
agency;30 that regulatory power can be distributed between a federal 
agency and state governments or within the states alone;31 or that 
regulatory power can be distributed through public-private 
partnerships, “new governance,” “modular environmental regulation,” 
and other types of flexible, multipolar governance schemes with 
private participants.32 Scholars in each of these areas have recognized 
the possibility of regulatory or governance initiatives in which federal, 
state, local, and/or private actors play roles and examined the many 
values that such structures promote.33 Focusing in-depth on shared 
 
 29. See Horcrux, HARRY POTTER WIKI, http://harrypotter.wikia.com/wiki/Horcrux 
[https://perma.cc/6S75-THFD] (“Creating multiple Horcruxes rendered the soul unstable and 
liable to break apart if the creator of the Horcruxes was killed. For instance, Dumbledore 
explicitly stated that Voldemort’s soul had become so unstable that it simply ‘broke apart’ when 
Voldemort tried to murder Harry Potter . . . .”).  
 30. See, e.g., Aagaard, supra note 18, at 1239; Freeman & Rossi, supra note 18, at 1131 
(focusing on coordination challenges of shared regulatory space and advocating presidential 
control); Sarah E. Light, The Military-Environmental Complex, 55 B.C. L. REV. 879, 881, 885 
(2014) (discussing the DoD’s role in promoting climate resilience to protect national security, 
rather than environmental, interests); Spence, supra note 6, at 416 (noting that distribution of 
power between federal agencies, or between the agency and a principal like Congress through a 
more limited delegation, may affect policy outcomes). 
 31. Discussions of the values promoted by federalism, decentralization, and cooperative 
federalism, and examples of such programs are too numerous to cite. For several in-depth 
discussions, see generally William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and 
the Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1555–56 (2007); Michael C. Dorf & Charles 
F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 314 (1998); 
Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570 (1996); Sarah E. 
Light, Precautionary Federalism and the Sharing Economy, 66 EMORY L.J. 333 (2017); Richard 
L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale 
for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992). 
 32. See Jody Freeman & Daniel A. Farber, Modular Environmental Regulation, 54 DUKE 
L.J. 795, 798–803 (2005) (proposing dynamic, flexible, and adaptive arrangements for 
environmental governance in contrast to traditional environmental law); Orly Lobel, The Renew 
Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 
MINN. L. REV. 342, 344–47 (2004) (discussing the shift from a top-down regulation model to a 
multipolar governance model). 
 33. Anne Joseph O’Connell has explored the related, though distinct, phenomenon of 
bureaucratic institutions at the boundary of the federal administrative state, in which the 
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regulatory space across multiple federal agencies , between the federal 
government and the states, or through public-private hybrid 
governance generates valuable insights in each specific context. 
Examining regulatory horcruxes as a single phenomenon reveals a 
bigger picture story about how comparative methods of strategic 
institutional design can make successor exit more challenging in a 
deregulatory environment, while retaining power to achieve regulatory 
goals.  
B. Institution and Degree of Overlap 
There are three sets of institutions that can either share regulatory 
authority with or replace the primary federal agency responsible for 
environmental or natural resources protection. The first set of 
institutions comprises federal agencies whose primary mission is 
something other than environmental protection, such as the DoD or 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), among others. 
Because these agencies do not have environmental protection as their 
primary mission, I refer to them here as “secondary” agencies. 
Regulatory programs can exist either entirely in such a secondary 
federal agency or can be shared between a secondary agency and the 
primary agency. Such splitting or sharing of regulatory programs at the 
federal level generates horizontal horcruxes. The second set of 
institutions comprises government agencies at the subfederal level, 
including state and local governments.34 Splitting or sharing of 
regulatory programs between the primary agency and subfederal 
institutions creates vertical horcruxes. Finally, it is possible for private 
institutions, including  NGOs, private corporations or other firms, and 
industry groups, among others, to share regulatory space with federal 
 
institutions themselves incorporate aspects of international, state, or private participation, such 
as in the cases of the National Railroad Passenger Corporation, the National Guard, the World 
Bank, and the U.S. Postal Service. Anne Joseph O’Connell, Bureaucracy at the Boundary, 162 U. 
PA. L. REV. 841, 846 (2014).  
 34. Recent scholarship on “regionalism” has argued that decentralized federal actors can 
generate policy variation and are worthy of examination in the federalism literature. See generally 
Yishai Blank & Issi Rosen-Zvi, Reviving Federal Regions, 70 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) 
(draft on file with the Duke Law Journal); Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Our Regionalism, 166 U. PA. 
L. REV. 377 (2017); David Fontana, Federal Decentralization, VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) 
(draft on file with the Duke Law Journal); David Owen, Regional Federal Administration, 63 
UCLA L. REV. 58 (2016). However, because these actors remain federal actors within the 
hierarchy of a single federal agency, they do not fit in the discussion of vertical horcruxes. To the 
extent that regionalism exists within the context of a horizontal horcrux, the analysis of horizontal 
horcruxes may apply.  
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agencies. This final set of institutions generates private horcruxes. 
The second feature that differentiates the various types of horcrux 
is the degree of overlap or split in power between the primary and the 
secondary institution. At one end of this continuum lie those programs 
that involve overlapping jurisdiction between the primary federal 
agency and the secondary institution or institutions. These are shared 
horcruxes. At the other end of the spectrum are those that exist entirely 
within the secondary institution, without any continuing oversight or 
participation by the primary federal agency. These are external 
horcruxes. Different degrees of sharing and continuing participation by 
the primary federal agency exist along a continuum, so this binary 
analysis necessarily involves some oversimplification.35  
C. The Two-Step Creation Process 
Of course, the horcrux analogy, although useful, is imperfect. To 
create a horcrux, Lord Voldemort had to commit murder.36 The 
creation process for regulatory horcruxes is somewhat less bloody, but 
one step more complex. Unlike most of the horcruxes into which Lord 
Voldemort split his soul—a diary, a ring, a locket, a cup, and a 
diadem37—the secondary institutions examined here are not inanimate 
objects. They are institutions with both independent leadership and 
either public or private constituencies and stakeholders. Therefore, the 
creation of a regulatory horcrux has both a necessary condition and a 
sufficient condition. The necessary condition is some action on the part 
of the federal government to place either some or all of a regulatory 
program into a secondary institution. Action in this sense extends to 
action that consciously does not preclude the secondary institution 
from acting on its own, for example, a conscious decision by Congress 
 
 35. Alejandro Camacho and Robert Glicksman have argued that efforts at agency design 
and redesign have often failed to appreciate three different dimensions of centralization, overlap, 
and coordination, each of which affects how well programs fare against the normative values of 
effectiveness, efficiency, equity, and legitimacy. Alejandro E. Camacho & Robert L. Glicksman, 
Functional Government in 3-D: A Framework for Evaluating Allocations of Government 
Authority, 51 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 19, 21–23 (2014). Here, I focus on centralization and overlap 
measured against the value of durability, but do not address the efforts at coordination that have 
been the subject of extensive discussions elsewhere. 
 36. See ROWLING, supra note 1. 
 37. See Horcrux, supra note 29 (listing the different horcruxes that Lord Voldemort created). 
It is worth noting that one horcrux was embedded into a living snake, and that there is some 
debate over whether Harry himself became a horcrux when Lord Voldemort killed his parents. 
Id. However, the majority were inanimate objects.  
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or an agency not to preempt state action.38 Perfection of a horcrux 
requires additional action on the part of the secondary institution to 
accept it.  
In the case of horizontal horcruxes, these two steps merge into 
one: Congress can simply assign shared authority over a regulatory 
program to both the primary agency and a secondary agency, or assign 
all of the regulatory program to a secondary agency. However, these 
two steps are discrete in the case of both vertical and private horcruxes. 
Congress can create a regulatory program in which the federal 
government and the states share regulatory authority. Or Congress can 
create a program that does not preempt the states from acting on their 
own. Likewise, Congress can create a program in which the federal 
government and a private actor share regulatory responsibility. In the 
second step, the state or private actor must accept responsbility to 
enforce or implement the horcrux. 
Only when both of these steps occur do external horizontal and 
vertical horcruxes fit into the horcrux model. The center, however 
defined, must intentionally vest these alternative regulators with 
regulatory power and must retain the power to destroy the horcrux. 
This two-step process thus reveals that purely private environmental 
governance39 does not fit into the horcrux framework. Mere federal 
government inaction in a particular sphere is not sufficient to meet the 
horcrux creation threshold. Private environmental governance can 
arise if Congress simply chooses not to regulate in a particular area, or 
when an agency likewise chooses not to exercise its authority to 
regulate. Yet the federal government cannot preempt private actors 
from undertaking private governance that goes beyond federal 
standards. Because the federal government does not need to act 
intentionally to create private environmental governance, and cannot 
 
 38. Cf. generally Sarah E. Light, Advisory Nonpreemption, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 327 (2017) 
(discussing how a federal agency can choose not to exercise preemptive power granted to it by 
Congress to permit state experimentation).  
 39. See, e.g., Sarah E. Light & Eric W. Orts, Parallels in Public and Private Environmental 
Governance, 5 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 1, 9–12 (2015) [hereinafter Light & Orts, Parallels 
in Public and Private Environmental Governance] (examining the parallel tools that private and 
public environmental governance employ); Sarah E. Light, The New Insider Trading: 
Environmental Markets Within the Firm, 34 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 5–6 (2015) (discussing private 
carbon fees and emissions trading schemes as forms of private environmental governance with 
global implications); Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, 99 CORNELL 
L. REV. 129, 133–34 (2013) (identifying private environmental governance as occupying a 
significant role in environmental standard-setting and enforcement in light of gaps in positive 
environmental law). 
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destroy private environmental governance through preemption, it does 
not fit the horcrux framework.40 
Combining these three sets of institutions with the different 
degrees of overlap yields the following 3 x 2 matrix: 
Table 1: A Matrix of Horcruxes 
 Institutional Actor 
Horizontal 
Horcrux 
Vertical 
Horcrux 
Private Horcrux 
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Concurrent 
jurisdiction 
between the 
primary 
federal agency 
and the 
secondary 
federal agency 
 
 
Concurrent 
jurisdiction 
between the 
federal 
government 
and the 
states/local 
government 
 
Cooperative 
federalism 
 
Public-Private 
Partnerships 
 
Collaborative 
Governance 
 
Reflexive Law 
 
Management-based 
regulation 
 
Private Citizen Suits 
E
xt
er
na
l 
 
Program exists 
entirely in a 
secondary 
federal agency 
or agencies 
 
 
State or local 
control over a 
regulatory 
program 
without federal 
agency 
involvement 
 
Not a Horcrux 
 
Private 
Environmental 
Governance 
 
 40. That being said, as I and others have argued elsewhere, private environmental 
governance is an important regulatory phenomenon in its own right. See supra note 39. In 
addition, law is certainly necessary to create the space for private organizations and civil society 
to function and adopt private environmental governance. Light & Orts, Parallels in Public and 
Private Environmental Governance, supra note 39, at 11–12 & nn.36–38 (citing ERIC W. ORTS, 
BUSINESS PERSONS: A LEGAL THEORY OF THE FIRM 1–108 (rev. ed. 2015)); Sarah E. Light, The 
Law of the Corporation as Environmental Law, 71 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (draft on 
file with the Duke Law Journal) (arguing that corporate law, antitrust law, securities regulation, 
and bankruptcy law, collectively affect private firms’ incentives to engage in private 
environmental governance).  
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 These categories are not necessarily exclusive. It is possible that a 
program may be shared between two federal agencies and incorporate 
state participation as well. 
The next sections offer more specific examples of the different 
types of horcrux to fill out the contours in greater depth. It is worth 
noting that these examples were not necessarily created with a horcrux 
framework in mind. This framework is intended to be both analytical 
and descriptive, but it is not a positive account of why existing 
regulatory programs look the way they do. 
D. Horcrux Examples  
1. Horizontal Horcruxes.  Federal agencies are simultaneously 
tasked with achieving multiple goals, including potentially conflicting 
goals, in a phenomenon that Eric Biber has dubbed the challenge of 
“multiple-goal agencies.”41 Rather than considering how a single 
agency prioritizes conflicting goals, the horcrux framework focuses on 
the goal itself, and the impact that fragmenting a program across 
multiple agencies or placing it entirely into an agency with a different 
core mission has on achieving that goal over time. Thus, horcruxes 
represent a shift from a framework of multiple-goal agencies to 
multiple-agency goals or alternative-agency goals. Horizontal 
horcruxes are likely to be the strongest of the three types at 
maintaining the scope of a program, including addressing interstate 
spillovers or other problems of national scope. Yet they are likely the 
weakest of the three types at resisting deregulatory pressure at the 
federal level. In the environmental context, if the EPA is in the 
crosshairs of a deregulatory push by the president and Congress, other 
agencies may face a similar deregulatory push by those same principals. 
However, the need to frame a problem differently to generate a 
horizontal horcrux, in terms that are consistent with the mission of the 
secondary agency, may provide some insulation from this pressure, as 
different constituencies may continue to support the program for 
different reasons. 
Some federal regulatory programs are shared between the 
primary federal agency and secondary agencies. These shared 
horizontal horcruxes take a variety of forms.42 Well-known examples 
 
 41. Eric Biber, Too Many Things to Do: How to Deal with the Dysfunctions of Multiple-Goal 
Agencies, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 4–6 (2009). 
 42. See generally Freeman & Rossi, supra note 18 (offering different mechanisms for 
coordinating shared regulatory space including interagency consultation, interagency agreements, 
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in the environmental context include the shared authority under the 
Clean Water Act permitting program, pursuant to which the EPA and 
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers jointly define the “waters of the 
United States” for federal permitting requirements under Sections 402 
and 404 of the Act.43 The EPA and the DOE share responsibility for 
administering the Energy Star program, a government-sponsored 
certification program for energy-efficient appliances and other 
products which has, since the program’s creation in 1992, reduced 
greenhouse gas emissions by 2.7 billion metric tons.44 Other shared 
horizontal horcruxes include regulatory programs addressing lead 
paint in residential housing, in which both the Department of Housing 
and Urban Development (HUD) and the EPA play a role.45 
External horizontal horcruxes include programs housed entirely 
in a secondary federal agency or agencies whose mission does not 
expressly include environmental protection. Many of the programs 
that are part of “the military-environmental complex”46 fit into this 
category. Although the DoD’s mission is to protect the national 
security interest of the United States, not the environment, it is also the 
largest consumer of energy in the nation, the federal agency that would 
respond to geo-political instability resulting from extreme weather 
events, a landowner that manages military installations facing the 
threat of rising seas, and a warfighter that must equip its personnel with 
energy resources in remote operational locations.47 Congress has 
therefore tasked the DoD with reducing fossil fuel energy use and 
developing new sources of renewable energy for electric power 
generation to promote national security. Congress created an external 
horizontal horcrux when it directed the DoD, alone among federal 
 
joint policymaking, and joint rulemaking).  
 43. Clean Water Act §§ 402, 404, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342, 1344 (2012). There is also a vertical 
horcrux in these provisions. See infra notes 64–65 and accompanying text. 
 44. 42 U.S.C. § 6294a (2012); U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ENERGY STAR OVERVIEW OF 
2015 ACHIEVEMENTS (2015), https://www.energystar.gov/sites/default/files/asset/document/
ES_OverviewAchievements_040816-508.pdf [https://perma.cc/W6ZT-H45E]. See generally 
Energy Star, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.energystar.gov [https://perma.cc/DV4B-
HH8S]. This figure is equivalent to taking 578 million cars off the road for one year. Greenhouse 
Gas Equivalencies Calculator, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Sept. 2017), 
https://www.epa.gov/energy/greenhouse-gas-equivalencies-calculator [https://perma.cc/E2DA-
Q76A]. 
 45. Residential Lead-Based Paint Hazard Reduction Act of 1992 § 1018, 42 U.S.C. § 4852d 
(2012) (directing HUD and EPA to require the disclosure of known lead-based paint hazards 
before the sale or lease of housing built prior to 1978).  
 46. Light, supra note 30, at 884. 
 47. Id. at 881, 885, 892, 893–94, 899 & n.100. 
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agencies, “to produce or procure not less than 25 percent of the total 
quantity of facility energy it consumes within its facilities during fiscal 
year 2025 and each fiscal year thereafter from renewable energy 
sources.”48 Given the significant impact of electricity generation on 
greenhouse gas emissions in the United States, increasing the share of 
renewables in the grid can have a net positive impact on the 
environment, and DoD actions can have positive spillover effects in the 
private sector.49 Notwithstanding the many deregulatory efforts 
targeting the climate and environmental programs housed in primary 
federal agencies with environmental missions like the EPA and the 
DOI, Congress nonetheless passed the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, which expresses Congress’s 
position that “climate change is a direct threat to the national security 
of the United States,” and directs the DoD to “ensure that it is 
prepared to conduct operations both today and in the future and that 
it is prepared to address the effects of a changing climate on threat 
assessments, resources, and readiness.”50 
Other external horizontal horcruxes include environmental 
disclosure rules adopted and enforced by the SEC, whose mission is to 
protect investors, to maintain fair markets, and facilitate the formation 
of capital.51 Under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, the SEC requires publicly traded firms to 
disclose information that is “material” to investors.52 Significant 
environmental matters, such as material risks to a firm’s business 
arising out of domestic or international regulations or litigation, must 
be disclosed in quarterly and annual reports to investors.53 In 2010, the 
SEC issued guidance to public companies making clear that these 
existing rules require disclosure of climate-related risks, including 
 
 48. 10 U.S.C. § 2911(e) (2012); Light, supra note 30, at 908. 
 49. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND 
SINKS ES-24 (2015), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017-02/documents/2017_
complete_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/LGU7-YZ3D]. 
 50. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-91, § 335(b), 
131 Stat. 1283, 1358 (2017). 
 51. What We Do, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/Article/
whatwedo.html [https://perma.cc/E3SJ-763F]. 
 52. Standard Instructions for Filing Forms Under Securities Act of 1933, Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 and Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975—Regulation S-K 17 
C.F.R. §§ 229.10–229.702 (2012). 
 53. See generally Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and 
Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197 (1999) (discussing the history of 
environmental and social disclosures under SEC rules).  
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those arising from existing or potential climate litigation or regulations 
and those relating to the physical effects of climate change.54 This 
information disclosure regime is analogous to various environmental 
disclosure regimes managed by the EPA,55 but is housed entirely within 
a secondary federal agency. 
2. Vertical Horcruxes.  The allocation of authority between the 
federal government and subfederal governments can take a variety of 
forms, only some of which allow the states or local governments to act 
as co-regulators with the federal government, or solo regulators 
pursuing continued regulatory action in the face of federal 
retrenchment or deregulation. Although the federal government can 
expressly create a shared vertical horcrux with co-regulatory authority 
in the states, the federal government can only take the first step to 
enable the necessary conditions for an external vertical horcrux. In that 
case, the state or local government must accept the invitation. The 
federal government maintains a “trump card” under the Supremacy 
Clause to preempt state or local rules that are not identical to a federal 
standard.56 This preemption can occur expressly in statutory language, 
as in the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, which 
expressly prohibits state pesticide labeling rules.57 In other cases, even 
in the absence of express language, courts have concluded that 
Congress has impliedly preempted the entire “field,” because federal 
regulation is so pervasive that there is no room for state or local 
governance, or because there is a conflict between state and federal 
law.58 Thus, whether vertical horcruxes can exist in either form is a 
 
 54. SEC Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change (Final 
Rule), 75 Fed. Reg. 6289, 6290–97 (Feb. 8, 2010) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 211, 231, and 241).  
 55. Sarah E. Light, NEPA’s Footprint: Information Disclosure as a Quasi-Carbon Tax on 
Agencies, 87 TUL. L. REV. 511, 513 (2013) (discussing various environmental information 
disclosure regimes). 
 56. Heather K. Gerken, Slipping the Bonds of Federalism, 128 HARV. L. REV. 85, 118 (2014) 
(noting that Congress holds a “supremacy trump card”); see also Buzbee, supra note 31, at 1590–
92 (discussing ceiling preemption, which he calls “[u]nitary [f]ederal [c]hoice”). But see Jessica 
Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256, 1265, 1276–
78 (2009) (arguing that states are sometimes “uncooperative” in federal schemes where the 
federal government maintains preemptive power, limiting the federal government’s ability to play 
its “trump card”).  
 57. 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (2012).  
 58. See Buzbee, supra note 31, at 1560–76 (discussing different forms of preemption under 
federal law); Christopher H. Schroeder, Supreme Court Preemption Doctrine, in PREEMPTION 
CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF FEDERALISM’S CORE QUESTION 119 (William 
Buzbee ed., 2009) (discussing the Supreme Court’s preemption doctrine).  
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question of strategic regulatory design at the federal level. Shared 
vertical horcruxes are likely to be as powerful as horizontal horcruxes 
at achieving national goals or addressing interstate spillovers that the 
states alone could not address because in each case the federal 
government retains a role in the program.59 External vertical horcruxes 
are likely to be weaker in this regard, however, as one state may be 
unable to address pollution arising from another state. With respect to 
deregulatory pressure, what can be created can likewise be taken away; 
thus, vertical horcruxes remain within the zone of deregulatory 
danger.60 However, by creating a new constituency within a state or 
states that participate in the implementation and enforcement of a 
regulatory program, this deregulatory power may become more 
difficult to exercise over time.61 
In the absence of preemption or any other constitutional limits on 
state action such as under the Dormant Commerce Clause,62 however, 
states and local governments can be co-regulators with a primary 
federal agency or solo regulators in different forms of vertical 
horcruxes. A decision by the federal government to create a 
cooperative federalism regime generates shared vertical horcruxes. 
Examples include state enforcement of federal regulatory standards 
under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA).63 A 
second example under the Clean Water Act is the structure of the 
 
 59. See generally Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environmental Externalities, 
144 U. PA. L. REV. 2341 (1996) (proposing ways to address interstate pollution externalities more 
effectively than the EPA and courts were doing at the time).  
 60. Indeed, states’ rights are often cited as a rationale for deregulation though there is always 
the risk that this may include only states’ rights to pollute, not states’ rights to promote greater 
environmental protection. Richard Revesz, Opinion, According to Scott Pruitt, States Only Have 
the Right to Pollute, Not Protect Their Environments, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2017, 4:00 AM), 
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-revesz-pruitt-epa-federalism-20170320-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/V8P4-B4GZ]. 
 61. See Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON. BEHAV. 
& ORG. 39, 43–44 (1980) (discussing the “endowment effect,” which is the theory that people 
ascribe greater value to what they already own, as the “underweighting of opportunity costs”). 
 62. See Am. Trucking Ass’n v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 545 U.S. 429, 433 (2005) (noting 
that the Dormant Commerce Clause precludes the states from “plac[ing] burdens on the flow of 
commerce across its borders that commerce wholly within those borders would not bear” (quoting 
Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 180 (1995)) (alteration in original)).  
 63. States have lead responsibility for implementing federal regulatory requirements, and 
must submit their programs to the EPA for a so-called “determination of adequacy.” Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act § 4005, 42 U.S.C. § 6945(c)(1)(C) (2012). The EPA can authorize 
states to implement their own approved state programs instead of the federal program. § 3006, 42 
U.S.C. § 6926 (2012); 40 C.F.R. § 271.1 (2017).  
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Section 402/404 permit program.64 Whereas the EPA and the U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers share responsibility for ensuring that no 
discharge of a pollutant into waters of the United States occurs without 
a federal permit, the Act incorporates a significant shared vertical 
horcrux. Under Section 401, one seeking a permit to discharge into the 
navigable waters of the United States must further seek approval from 
the relevant state, which has authority to set water quality standards.65 
State approval is required even if the entity requesting the permit is a 
federal agency. Thus, in the face of federal retrenchment or any easing 
in the granting of permits, the states serve as an important potential 
regulatory backstop. 
When a state is afforded special authority under a federal statute 
to adopt its own regulatory standards, subject to EPA approval, this 
creates a vertical horcrux. For example, although the Clean Air Act 
generally preempts any state or political subdivision from adopting or 
attempting to enforce “any standard relating to the control of 
emissions from new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines,”66 
there is an external vertical horcrux embedded within this regulatory 
program. California is exempt from preemption if it can demonstrate 
that its emissions standards are “at least as protective of public health 
and welfare as” the federal standards, and obtains a waiver from the 
EPA.67 The California waiver has been crucial in the iterative 
development of motor vehicle emissions standards over time, and now 
arguably serves as one of the most important backstops against federal 
efforts to reduce the stringency of vehicle emissions and fuel economy 
standards.68 
The federal government can also create external vertical 
 
 64. Clean Water Act §§ 402, 404, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342, 1344 (2012). 
 65. 33 U.S.C. § 1341; see also PUD No.1 of Jefferson Cty. v. Wash. Dept. of Ecology, 511 
U.S. 700, 711 (1994); cf. Spence, supra note 6, at 426 (noting that Section 401 was adopted to 
“creat[e] more proenvironment decision outcomes in the hydro licensing program” managed by 
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission(FERC)).  
 66. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (2012).  
 67. Id. § 7543(b). Other states may then adopt California’s standards. Id. § 7507. Ironically, 
McNollgast’s discussion of the federalism issues within the Clean Air Act is a story of increasing 
“federalization” in the federal government. McNollgast, Structure and Process, supra note 6, at 
446–49. This Article finds the more interesting issue to arise from the authority that was left 
behind in the states.  
 68. See Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 
1099–1100 (2009); Jacques Leslie, In the Face of a Trump Environmental Rollback, California 
Stands in Defiance, YALEENVIRONMENT360 (Feb. 21, 2017), http://e360.yale.edu/features/in-the-
face-of-trump-environmental-rollback-california-stands-in-defiance [https://perma.cc/PW7W-
PZEU].  
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horcruxes when the federal government regulates in an area but 
specifically exempts a particular practice from federal rules. State 
governance of oil and gas leases or hydraulic fracturing is a prime 
example.69 For example, the Safe Drinking Water Act requires the 
EPA to set minimum requirements for effective state underground 
injection permit programs to prevent endangerment of drinking 
water.70 However, the underground injection of hydraulic fracturing 
“fluids or propping agents” is specifically exempt from this 
requirement, leaving regulation in this area up to the states.71 
Efforts by the states to address climate change from stationary 
sources, such as California’s AB-32 cap-and-trade program,72 likewise 
exemplify external vertical horcruxes. The Clean Air Act’s preemption 
provisions only apply to motor vehicle emissions; thus Congress 
expressly allowed the states to exceed federal standards from 
stationary sources of air emissions. This federal choice to allow the 
states to exceed federal standards permits the states to step in. A 
particularly compelling recent example of the importance of this 
external vertical horcrux arises out of the Trump administration’s 
statement that the United States intends to withdraw73 from the Paris 
Agreement on Climate Change (the Paris Agreement).74 On June 5, 
2017, several days after the president notified the international 
community of his intent to withdraw from the Agreement, the “We 
Are Still In” Declaration (the Declaration) was released.75 The 
 
 69. See David B. Spence, Federalism, Regulatory Lags, and the Political Economy of Energy 
Production, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 431, 506–08 (2013) (arguing that the states can continue to take a 
leading role in regulating hydraulic fracturing).  
 70. 42 U.S.C. § 300h(b)(1). 
 71. Id. § 300h(d)(1)(B)(ii). 
 72. California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 
§§ 38500–38599 (2006). 
 73. See Michael D. Shear, Trump Will Withdraw U.S. from Paris Climate Agreement, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/01/climate/trump-paris-climate-
agreement.html [https://perma.cc/VGV8-H3VD]. Under the terms of the Agreement, withdrawal 
cannot formally take place until November 4, 2020, one year after a party gives notice of 
withdrawal, which cannot occur until three years after the agreement entered into force. Brad 
Plumer, The U.S. Won’t Actually Leave the Paris Climate Deal Anytime Soon, N.Y. TIMES (June 
7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/07/climate/trump-paris-climate-timeline.html [https://
perma.cc/ZWU7-LVLN]. 
 74. Conference of the Parties Dec. 1/CP.21 (Dec. 12, 2015), in Report of the Conference of 
the Parties on Its Twenty-First Session, Held in Paris from 30 November to 13 December 2015, 
Addendum, Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties at Its Twenty-First Session, 
FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1 (Jan. 29, 2016) [hereinafter Paris Agreement]. 
 75. “WE ARE STILL IN” DECLARATION, https://www.wearestillin.com/we-are-still-
declaration [https://perma.cc/D8SB-Y52T]. 
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Declaration states: “We, the undersigned mayors, county executives, 
governors, tribal leaders, college and university leaders, businesses, 
and investors are joining forces for the first time to declare that we will 
continue to support climate action to meet the Paris Agreement.”76 The 
Declaration acknowledges that “it is local, tribal, and state 
governments, along with businesses, that are primarily responsible for 
the dramatic decrease in greenhouse gas emissions in recent years. 
Actions by each group will multiply and accelerate in the years ahead, 
no matter what policies Washington may adopt.”77 As of January 2018, 
more than 2,500 cities, states, private firms, and universities have 
signed the Declaration.78 In addition, the governors of California, New 
York, and Washington State created the U.S. Climate Alliance to 
ensure “coordinated state action” to meet the goals of the Paris 
Agreement, which now counts among its members fourteen states and 
Puerto Rico.79 At the local level, 389 Mayors “representing 69 million 
Americans” have signed on as Climate Mayors and remain committed 
to meeting the goals of the Paris Agreement.80 America’s Pledge is an 
additional effort led by Governor Jerry Brown and former Mayor of 
New York Michael Bloomberg “to compile and quantify the actions of 
states, cities and businesses” to reduce their greenhouse gas 
emissions.81 These vertical horcruxes have potential to keep the United 
States moving in the right direction toward the goals set by the United 
States under the Paris Agreement, even in the face of exit by the 
federal government. This was not merely a random, fortuitous event, 
but depended upon strategic institutional design in the Clean Air Act 
and the Paris Agreement. The Paris Agreement expressly 
contemplated a role for subnational action to contribute to meeting the 
Agreement’s goals.82 And had Congress expressly preempted all state 
 
 76. Id.  
 77. Id.  
 78. Id. 
 79. UNITED STATES CLIMATE ALLIANCE: STATES UNITED FOR CLIMATE ACTION, 
https://www.usclimatealliance.org [https://perma.cc/9DTK-5L6H].  
 80. CITIES ADOPT THE PARIS CLIMATE AGREEMENT GOALS, http://climatemayors.org 
[https://perma.cc/2962-JB22]. 
 81. AMERICA’S PLEDGE, https://www.bloomberg.org/program/environment/americas-
pledge [https://perma.cc/K5NX-2FKL].  
 82. See Paris Agreement, supra note 74, § V (Non-Party stakeholders); id. para. 117 
(welcoming “the efforts of non-Party stakeholders to scale up their climate actions” and 
encouraging those actions to be registered “in the Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Action 
platform”); id. para. 133 (welcoming “the efforts of all non-Party stakeholders to address and 
respond to climate change, including those of civil society, the private sector, financial institutions, 
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and local action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions arising from 
stationary sources under the Clean Air Act, such actions would not be 
possible in the face of deregulatory pressure at the federal level. 
3. Private Horcruxes.  The final type of horcrux, which exists only 
in a shared form, involves private institutions acting as co-regulators 
with the federal government. There are many different private 
horcruxes, all of which fall at different points along the continuum of 
overlapping authority. As a result, they also have different degrees of 
tradeoff between centralization and insulation from deregulatory 
pressure. The private horcrux that retains the highest degree of both 
centralization and power to achieve national regulatory priorities is 
contained in the citizen-suit provisions that Congress adopted in almost 
every major federal environmental statute.83 After giving notice of an 
environmental violation to the violator, the relevant state, and the 
EPA administrator, a private citizen or an environmental advocacy 
organization may file suit to enforce federal environmental 
regulations.84 These citizen-suit provisions encourage private actors to 
bring such suits by providing for attorney’s fees.85 Unlike other federal 
statutes that expand private remedies for private wrongs,86 these 
citizen-suit provisions allow private actors to deter and enjoin public 
wrongs as “private attorneys general”87 when there is a concern that 
 
cities and other subnational authorities”); NAZCA: TRACKING CLIMATE ACTION, 
http://climateaction.unfccc.int [https://perma.cc/9L9W-FGCY] (recording “the commitments to 
climate action by companies, cities, subnational, regions, investors, and civil society 
organizations”). 
 83. Citizen-suit provisions are found in the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) 
(2012); the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2012); the Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (2012); the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2012); and the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9659 (2012). I do not 
include suits against an agency for failing to undertake a non-discretionary duty, which are also 
contained in these provisions, as horcruxes. Citizen-suit provisions do exist outside the 
environmental context, notably in the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3731 (2012). Judicially 
created private rights of action exist in other regulatory contexts as well. See Richard B. Stewart 
& Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1193, 1198 (1982) 
(examining different judicially created private rights to address regulatory failures).  
 84. See supra note 83. 
 85. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d); 42 U.S.C. § 6972(e); 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d); 42 U.S.C. § 9659(f). More 
citizen suits have been litigated under the Clean Water Act than any other statute. Barton H. 
Thompson, Jr., The Continuing Innovation of Citizen Enforcement, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 185, 204 
(2000).  
 86. An example of this is Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2012), which allows 
for the awarding of treble damages and attorney fees. 
 87. Barry Boyer & Errol Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement: A Preliminary 
Assessment of Citizen Suits Under Federal Environmental Laws, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 833, 837 (1985). 
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the federal or state governments are underenforcing public law. 
However, private citizen suits are not necessarily as powerful as the 
federal government itself enforcing these laws. To invoke the federal 
courts’ jurisdiction, private citizens must demonstrate standing, and 
they are generally, though not always, limited to seeking relief for 
ongoing harm through injunctive relief, rather than damages for past 
harms.88 To the extent that they are permitted by the statutes to seek 
damages, such damages are paid to the federal treasury. Although 
Congress adopted these citizen-suit provisions as part of the original 
statutory schemes, it was only in the mid-1980s that private actors 
began to use them in significant measure, precisely when the federal 
EPA was in a deregulatory phase under the Reagan administration.89 
Congress could certainly destroy these private horcruxes by amending 
these statutes, but their power to address national problems remains 
significant. 
A second set of private horcruxes falls under the category of 
reflexive law or management-based regulation, in which the federal 
government encourages a private entity, often a firm, to adopt a private 
environmental management system or otherwise to exceed mandatory 
compliance levels.90 One example of this is the now-defunct Project 
XL, in which the EPA would agree to approve a single, comprehensive 
permit for a firm that made private commitments to improve its 
environmental performance, thus streamlining the often complex 
permitting process. Government agencies can also incorporate private 
standards by reference, can endorse private standards, or can adopt 
them as safe harbors or best practices.91 Alternatively, federal agencies 
can contract with private entities to implement federal programs or 
provide services pursuant to federal programs.92 
 
 88. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 50 (1987) 
(holding that the Clean Water Act citizen-suit provision permits only suits for ongoing violations). 
After Gwaltney, Congress amended the Clean Air Act to permit citizen suits for past violations. 
42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(1). 
 89. Boyer & Meidinger, supra note 87, at 835. 
 90. See Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing Private 
Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 691, 696–700 (2003); Jody Freeman, 
Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 55–66 (1997); Eric W. 
Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1227, 1271–72 (1995).  
 91. See generally Lesley K. McAllister, Harnessing Private Regulation, 3 MICH. J. ENVTL. & 
ADMIN. L. 291 (2014) (discussing multiple ways in which agencies can “harness” private 
governance); David Zaring, Best Practices, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 294, 296 (2006) (discussing how 
agencies adopt private “best practices” as regulatory standards). 
 92. See Freeman, supra note 90, at 55–66 (offering examples of collaboration between public 
agencies and private contractors). 
LIGHT IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/21/2018  6:47 PM 
1672  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67:1647 
E. Who Can Create Horcruxes? 
The question of who can create a horcrux depends largely upon 
the type. For horizontal horcruxes, Congress is likely to be the initiator 
because there are limits on whether one agency can redelegate 
authority over a regulatory program to a different agency. With respect 
to vertical horcruxes, the authority is somewhat more dispersed. In an 
authorizing statute, Congress may (a) choose to preempt state law 
expressly, (b) create a comprehensive scheme that a court might find 
to preempt the field as a matter of implication, (c) not preempt state 
law, or (d) carve out a limited exception from preemption of state law 
such as the California waiver provision under the Clean Air Act.93 But 
federal agencies, too, have a role to play in preemption both when 
Congress has expressly delegated authority to the agency to determine 
whether state law is preempted, and when Congress has delegated 
interpretive power to the agency, with preemptive consequences.94 
Even when Congress delegates power to agencies to preempt or to 
interpret statutory provisions that will have preemptive effect, the 
agency need not always choose to exercise that authority—a form of 
nonpreemption, which is often a matter of conscious choice.95 For 
shared private horcruxes, Congress may create a program that involves 
joint federal-private action, or an agency may choose to delegate 
standard-setting authority to a private institution or choose to work 
with a private actor in some form of collaborative governance. 
F. When Can Horcruxes Be Created? 
Unlike agency burrowing or self-insulation techniques, which are 
 
 93. See supra note 70. 
 94. See generally Light, supra note 38, at 327 (discussing nonpreemption of state regulatory 
experimentation through agency interpretive power); Nina A. Mendelson, A Presumption 
Against Agency Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 695 (2008) (arguing for limiting agencies’ 
authority to preempt state law); Catherine Sharkey, Inside Agency Preemption, 110 MICH. L. 
REV. 521 (2012) (discussing federal agencies’ role in preemption). But see Joshua Hawkes & Mark 
Seidenfeld, A Positive Defense of Administrative Preemption, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 63, 64 
(2014) (offering a more positive view of agency preemption). For example, in the 2016 
amendments to the Toxic Substances Control Act, Congress authorized the EPA to grant waivers 
from preemption of state law under certain circumstances. Sarah E. Light, Regulating Toxic 
Chemicals Through Precautionary Federalism, 3 PENN UNDERGRADUATE L.J. 1, 12–13 (2016) 
(discussing preemption and waiver provisions). 
 95. Light, supra note 38, at 328; cf. Lazarus, supra note 10, at 1228–29 (discussing different 
“triggers” for federal preemption or nonpreemption of state action in the climate context, such as 
a “formal finding or action by a designated government official” or committee of experts).  
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best employed during the lame duck period,96 or the creation of a new 
independent agency designed to be insulated from short-term interest 
group pressure,97 there is some flexibility as to when a regulatory 
horcrux can be created. 
Undoubtedly, horcruxes can be created by the initiating regulator 
at the program’s inception. But they can also be added later by a 
sympathetic successor government.98 In addition, a successor agency 
can create a vertical horcrux through its interpretive powers to choose 
nonpreemption of state law.99 In some sense, private horcruxes are the 
most flexible type. Agencies frequently delegate standard-setting 
power to private standard-setting organizations and have the ability to 
redelegate or withdraw that power over time.100 The key point is that 
the creation and destruction of horcruxes is not limited to the initiating 
regulator at the time a regulatory program is created. Just as 
antiregulatory successors can take steps to move toward regulatory 
exit, proregulatory successors have the ability to harden or insulate 
existing regulatory programs through the use of horcruxes. 
II.  WHY HORCRUXES? 
While Part I examines the basic characteristics of horcruxes, this 
Part asks the normative question of why a regulator would employ 
horcruxes at all. What policy objectives do they serve and what 
challenges or harms might they present from the perspective of the 
initiating regulator and successor administrations? The primary 
normative concern animating this entire discussion is to ensure that a 
regulatory program ends when it “should”—neither too early, nor too 
late. The challenge of course, is that at any given moment, opposing 
interest groups will likely perceive the current regulatory program to 
 
 96. Mendelson, supra note 12, at 565 n.34. 
 97. Barkow, supra note 13, at 17.  
 98. Cf. Spence, supra note 6, at 426 (discussing the adoption of Section 401 of the Clean 
Water Act as a structural control designed to “creat[e] more proenvironment decision outcomes” 
in the separate regulatory licensing program for hydropower managed by FERC).  
 99. See Light, supra note 38, at 328, 330 n.13 (noting that the agency’s interpretation of 
whether the Motor Vehicle Safety Act preempted state law changed from a position of 
preemption to one of nonpreemption).  
 100. See Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 551–
56 (2000) (discussing private standard-setting as a common aspect of public law); Emily 
Hammond, Double-Deference in Administrative Law, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1705, 1710 (2016) 
(expressing concern that agencies give private standard-setting organizations deference, and then 
courts reviewing agency action give deference to such standards, without sufficient oversight at 
either level). 
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be overdue for exit and at the same time not yet fulfilling its regulatory 
mission. This Part therefore acknowledges that one’s perspective 
differs depending upon one’s relationship to the regulatory status 
quo.101  
A. Advantages 
Horcruxes are precautionary.102 They are more likely to preserve 
the status quo in the face of short-term opposition to a regulatory 
program, because they increase both the number of hoops that must be 
jumped through to exit a regulatory program and the number of 
constituencies with different values who are likely to care about 
continuing the program.103 Thus, they are a regulatory correlate of 
William Eskridge’s “vetogates”—rules of proceedings adopted by the 
House and Senate that “create multiple opportunities in each chamber 
for opponents to kill proposed legislation.”104 Programs shared across 
multiple federal agencies are often governed by multiple committees 
within the House or Senate, each of which may have an interest in 
continuing the program to maintain their control.105 Programs shared 
between the federal government and the states likewise have the power 
to generate multiple constituencies of support who may be reluctant to 
give up the benefits of the program. Such constituencies include not 
only regulators at the subfederal level, and public interest group 
beneficiaries of the regulations, but private firms whose business 
 
 101. See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 18, at 1135 n.4, 1138–39 (citing an extensive political 
science literature on “redundancy,” concluding that “[i]t is hard to generalize about redundancy, 
since sometimes it leads to beneficial outcomes and other times does not”) (citing JAMES Q. 
WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY DO IT 274 
(1989)).  
 102. Cf. Light, supra note 38, at 346–50, 360–65 (discussing how dynamic overlapping 
jurisdiction is precautionary, and exploring the circumstances under which precaution is 
desirable).  
 103. For a seminal discussion of the “costs of exit” in the political science literature, see Paul 
Pierson, Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 
251, 252, 262 (2000) (arguing that political actors often design policies in ways that “make 
preexisting arrangements hard to reverse” in anticipation of shifting political control).  
 104. Cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1441, 1444–46 (2008) (arguing that House and Senate rules create multiple “vetogates”—
procedural points in the legislative process where bills can die—beyond the requirements of 
Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution). 
 105. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 18, at 1139, 1144 (“[M]embers will be reluctant to dispense 
with delegation regimes that increase their ability to take credit and disperse blame or that help 
them to manage principal-agent slack.”); Horn & Shepsle, supra note 6, at 504 (discussing 
durability as a result of the congressional committee system). 
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models depend upon stability in the regulatory environment.106 
Programs shared between the federal government and private actors 
often have benefits in efficiency and expertise, in which the regulated 
community has a greater hand in shaping the regulations that govern 
it, and thus, greater buy-in. Programs that exist solely within secondary 
institutions likewise entrench their own constituencies of support. 
Horcruxes have the potential to improve democratic deliberation. 
Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson have argued that deliberative 
democracy is the solution to the problem of making binding, collective 
decisions despite “continuing moral conflict” in pluralistic societies.107 
Such conflict undoubtedly exists in the context of environmental 
regulation. Framing a problem as an environmental one may make a 
program more of a deregulatory target than framing it as a matter of 
national security, public health, or providing material information to 
investors.108 Because more voices play a role in the legislative or 
regulatory process, horizontal horcruxes may, like vetogates, increase 
the number of “legislative compromises, logrolls, and bundles” in a 
way that requires multiple voices to conclude that the program should 
end and its goals have been met.109 Daniel Farber and Anne Joseph 
O’Connell have recently argued that overlapping jurisdiction or 
requirements of coordination across federal agencies can “foster fuller 
development of information and debate, along with broader 
 
 106. William W. Buzbee, Federalism Hedging, Entrenchment, and the Climate Challenge, 2017 
WIS. L. REV. 1037, 1057, 1063 (arguing that overlapping jurisdiction creates constituencies of 
support among private firms in markets created by regulations, and that such constituencies rely 
on regulatory stability). 
 107. See Amy Gutmann & Dennis Thompson, Why Deliberative Democracy is Different, 17 
SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 161, 161 (2004) (noting that the fundamental principle of a deliberative theory 
“is that citizens owe one another justifications for the laws they collectively impose on one 
another”).  
 108. See generally Sarah E. Light, Valuing National Security: Climate Change, the Military, and 
Society, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1772, 1780–93 (2014) (surveying literature demonstrating partisanship 
and boomerang effects with respect to environmental framing of climate change as compared to 
framing climate change as a public health issue or one of national security).  
 109. See Eskridge, supra note 104, at 1449, 1453–54: 
If vetogates make statutes hard to enact, they make them doubly hard to repeal. To 
repeal a statute, supporters must not only press their proposal through various 
vetogates, but they must contend with a regulatory endowment effect: most statutes 
create constituencies and reliance interests for their regulatory regime, and these 
engender extra opposition to changing or abandoning the statutory policy.  
(citing Thaler, supra note 61, at 43–44 (defining the “endowment effect”)); cf. Freeman & Rossi, 
supra note 18, at 1142 (noting benefits of harnessing the “unique expertise and competencies of 
different agencies”).  
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representation for conflicting interests.”110 As with the vetogates 
model, horcruxes operate in a more complex fashion than simply 
making it harder to deregulate. It bears repeating that the challenge is 
not simply to increase the length of time that a program exists in a 
linear fashion at all costs. The challenge is rather to ensure that a 
regulatory program ends when its goals have been met and continues 
when its goals have not. By placing programs in the hands of multiple 
institutions, often with different primary missions, horcruxes can 
increase the likelihood that coalitions must form to change the 
program. 
When a single primary regulator like the EPA is the subject of 
special, targeted deregulatory pressure, horcruxes have the potential 
to increase the costs of short-term deregulatory pressure by providing 
alternative institutions to enforce regulatory programs.111 Jody 
Freeman and Jim Rossi have pointed out that when authority is 
dispersed across multiple agencies, interest groups must divide their 
lobbying efforts, which is costly.112 Dispersing authority also decreases 
the risk of agency capture113 and can improve policymaking.114 William 
Buzbee has argued that by lessening the impact of deregulation at the 
centralized federal level of government, overlapping jurisdiction 
between the federal government and the states can “hedge” against the 
consequences of regulatory reversal or “implementation failure” for 
 
 110. Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, Agencies as Adversaries, 105 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1375, 1384–87, 1407 (2017) (offering a taxonomy of different forms of interagency conflict, 
observing that conflicts can also occur within agencies, describing mechanisms by which such 
conflicts are resolved, and finding both benefits and costs in such conflicts).  
 111. Cf. Aagaard, supra note 18, at 1275:  
Congress can mitigate the risk of EPA implementation failure, or indeed 
implementation failure by any particular agency, by legislating across multiple fronts—
for example, multiple embedded environmental laws administered by different 
agencies, or both canonical and embedded environmental laws—thereby improving the 
likelihood that some policy to address the problem will be implemented. Delegating 
environmental laws across a broader range of institutions could allow other agencies to 
implement substitute policies when EPA is stymied. 
(footnote omitted) (citing Todd S. Aagaard, Regulatory Overlap, Overlapping Legal Fields, and 
Statutory Discontinuities, 29 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 237, 292–94 (2011)). Although Aagaard’s account 
focuses only on the embedding of environmental laws into other federal agencies, horcruxes can 
be created not only in other federal agencies subject to the control of the new administration, but 
also into the states and private hands, which are less subject to control by the president or 
Congress.  
 112. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 18, at 1142–43.  
 113. Id. at 1185–86.  
 114. Id. at 1143; cf. Katyal, supra note 18, at 2317 (“When [federal agencies] have to convince 
each other of why their view is right . . . better decision-making results.”). 
LIGHT IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/21/2018  6:47 PM 
2018] REGULATORY HORCRUXES 1677 
private firms that depend upon regulatory stability.115 Many of the 
same arguments hold for private horcruxes as well, though the 
institutions that must be lobbied differ.116 
By limiting the ability of short-term coalitions or factions to 
reflexively end regulatory programs, horcruxes have the potential to 
foreground the long-term public interest.117 Other scholars have 
written about the tradeoff between agency independence and 
democracy in the context of independent, rather than executive, 
agencies such as the Federal Reserve or the SEC, the heads of which 
are removable by the president only for cause, thus giving these 
agencies a measure of independence from political pressure that 
executive agencies lack.118 This independence arguably allows agencies 
to make decisions based on “expert information” rather than short-
term political pressure, especially for policies that may have short-term 
costs but long-term benefits.119 Environmental policies distribute costs 
and benefits across large time scales, making them a particular target 
for short-term interest group pressure.120 Others focusing on the 
phenomenon of “agency burrowing” before a presidential transition 
have argued that agencies can “entrench” policies to offset the concern 
that a new administration will be “overly responsive to a majoritarian 
faction.”121 The same concern may arise over a nonmajoritarian faction. 
 
 115. Buzbee, supra note 106, at 1039.  
 116. There is a substantial literature on the impact of activist and interest group pressure 
directly on firms, rather than public regulators or legislators through the political process. See 
generally David P. Baron, Private Politics, 12 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 31 (2003) (discussing 
activist boycotts targeting private firms as “private politics” and the resulting firm behavior as 
“private regulation”); David P. Baron, Private Politics, Corporate Social Responsibility, and 
Integrated Strategy, 10 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 7 (2001) (same); David P. Baron & Daniel 
Diermeier, Strategic Activism and Nonmarket Strategy, 16 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 599, 
600–01 (2007) (discussing firm responses to activism). 
 117. Cf. Barkow, supra note 13, at 19, 28–29 (arguing that agency independence prioritizes 
long-term public welfare over short-term political pressure); O’Connell, supra note 12, at 528 
(suggesting that the insulation of existing policies by outgoing presidents can be advantageous if 
they have long-term goals in mind).  
 118. Barkow, supra note 13, at 24–29. See generally PETER CONTI-BROWN, THE POWER AND 
INDEPENDENCE OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE (2016). 
 119. Barkow, supra note 13, at 33; Lazarus, supra note 10, at 1184–87 (identifying climate 
change as a “super wicked” problem because it magnifies various human biases against addressing 
long-term issues, and legislation to address it has long-term benefits and short-term costs).  
 120. Lazarus, supra note 10, at 1174–76; Light, supra note 31, at 348.  
 121. Mendelson, supra note 12, at 620.  
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B. Disadvantages 
Durability of the status quo, however, is not always a good thing, 
at least not from the perspective of a successor administration which 
arguably has a democratic mandate to advance its own regulatory 
priorities.122 Although the list of disadvantages may be shorter than the 
list of advantages, the primary concern is one that is deeply important 
to our democratic system: if horcruxes in fact make it more difficult for 
a successor administration to exit a regulatory program, horcruxes 
have the potential to limit the democratic accountability of the 
regulatory state, a problem that is central to administrative law.123 
Given the fact that the federal agencies that implement and enforce 
such regulatory programs are not themselves democratically 
accountable institutions, but rather derive their legitimacy from their 
status as agents of elected members of Congress and the president, any 
further loss of political accountability would be significant.124 
Horcruxes may limit the flexibility of a new administration to 
respond to changing or changed circumstances.125 In the context of 
constitutional interpretation, entrenchment of “original” 
interpretations over the concept of a “living” constitution has been 
referred to as creating the “dead hand” problem.126 Many scholars and 
political philosophers have rejected the idea that one generation’s 
understanding of the constitution should bind another, and that instead 
an understanding of the constitution as a living document is needed.127 
 
 122. Cf. Bruce R. Huber, The Durability of Private Claims to Public Property, 102 GEO. L.J. 
991, 995 (2014). Huber draws the important distinction between durability and longevity, arguing 
that durability implies “resilience and robustness in the face of strain or pressure or opposition,” 
while “[l]ongevity alone is generally not problematic.” Id. at 995, 995 n.14. In the horcrux context, 
the key issue is how to preserve the right kind of durability, not longevity alone. For an argument 
questioning the assumption that more political control necessarily produces “good or popular 
policies,” see Spence, supra note 15, at 438–39. 
 123. See Mendelson, supra note 12, at 566–67. 
 124. See id. at 577–78. 
 125. Cf. O’Connell, supra note 12, at 528. 
 126. See Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CALIF. L. REV. 277, 
357 (1985) (“The dead hand of the past ought not to govern, . . . and any theory of interpretation 
that demands that it does is a bad theory.”); Reva B. Siegel, Heller & Originalism’s Dead Hand—
In Theory and Practice, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1399, 1401 (2009). 
 127. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
11 (1980) (“[T]o the extent that [the Constitution] ever represented the ‘voice of the 
people’ . . . [it] represent[s] the voice of people who have been dead for a century or two.”); David 
Hume, Of the Original Contract, in ESSAYS: MORAL, POLITICAL AND LITERARY 452, 457 
(Oxford Univ. Press 1963) (1748) (rejecting the idea of “consent of the fathers to bind the 
children”); Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Of the Social Contract or Principles of Political Right, in THE 
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In the context of regulatory programs, an analogous argument could 
be made. Many administrative law scholars have argued that 
regulatory agencies are uniquely positioned to reinterpret the law to 
address changed circumstances.128 Horcruxes could potentially limit 
this flexibility. And though it may remain possible to overturn or 
reverse existing regulatory programs that contain horcruxes, these 
splits of regulatory authority could potentially increase the costs of 
such reversals.129 Finally, even if there is no immediate effort to exit 
such a regulatory program, regulatory overlap can be more costly at 
the outset.130 
Richard Lazarus has argued compellingly, however, that in the 
climate change context in particular, precommitment strategies to 
protect regulation from short-term reversals do not undermine 
democratic accountability; rather such asymmetric efforts to harden 
climate change law against deregulatory pressure enhance democratic 
accountability.131 In his view, ensuring the durability of climate change 
regulation or legislation is necessary to give future generations the 
ability to engage in the democratic process at all.132 In a similar vein, 
 
SOCIAL CONTRACT AND OTHER LATER POLITICAL WRITINGS 39, 111–12 (Cambridge Univ. 
Press 1997) (1762) (rejecting the idea that one generation can bind another through “perpetual 
Government”); Daniel E. Herz-Roiphe & David Singh Grewal, Make Me Democratic, But Not 
Yet: Sunrise Lawmaking and Democratic Constitutionalists, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1975, 2005 (2015) 
(characterizing the countermajoritarian difficulty as an intertemporal problem); Lazarus, supra 
note 10, at 1195–1200 (discussing debates over the “dead hand” problem and the value of 
precommitment strategies in the climate context).  
 128. See generally David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113 COLUM. 
L. REV. 265 (2013) (arguing that “big waiver”—a congressional delegation to agencies of the 
power to “unmake . . . statutory provisions”—is a powerful tool to update stale laws); Daniel T. 
Deacon, Administrative Forbearance, 125 YALE L.J. 1548 (2016) (discussing express delegations 
of administrative forbearance as a tool to address changed circumstance); Jody Freeman & David 
B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2014) (stating that federal agencies 
are well situated to update existing legislation to address new problems like climate change). 
 129. Cf. Mendelson, supra note 12, at 589–99 (increasing the procedures that must be utilized 
to reverse a rule increases the costs of doing so); Nou, supra note 12, at 1814–15 (increasing the 
scope of review in response to self-insulation increases the costs and resources required to review 
and overturn the rule, which may make such reviews so expensive that an executive who would 
otherwise overturn them decides not to do so). 
 130. See Jason Marisam, Duplicative Delegations, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 181, 184 (2011) (arguing 
that “antiduplication institutions” are needed to avoid the problems associated with redundancy). 
Freeman and Rossi reject the term “redundancy” as “misleading” because it “suggests literal 
duplication, and instead favor the more nuanced concept of ‘shared regulatory space.’” Freeman 
& Rossi, supra note 18, at 1135–36 (noting that the term “redundancy” comes from political 
science literature). 
 131. Lazarus, supra note 10, at 1194–1205 (offering reasons why asymmetric precommitment 
strategies in the climate context do not offend democratic values).  
 132. Id. at 1195; see also id. at 1154 (noting that the purpose of strategies to enhance the 
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Cass Sunstein has likened the need for precautionary legal rules in the 
climate context, in which climate change can lead to irreversible, 
catastrophic harm, as similar to purchasing an “option” to prevent 
harm at a later date.133 While these accounts focused on a different set 
of tools, the argument likewise applies to horcruxes in this context. 
A final concern is that there are weaknesses embedded within the 
horcruxes themselves. As regulatory authority becomes more 
dispersed or fragmented into secondary institutions away from the 
primary agency, this may increasingly insulate a program from 
deregulatory attack, yet the program may exist in a weakened state. 
For example, fragmentation may lead to coordination failures. After 
the September 11 attacks on the United States, the 9/11 Commission 
concluded that fragmentation among the nation’s intelligence and 
national security agencies led to failures of coordination that limited 
the ability of government to act on relevant intelligence information.134 
There are other ways in which a fragmented regulatory program may 
be less able to accomplish what a program centralized in a single 
primary regulator at the federal level could. Two examples illustrate 
this challenge. First, of all of the types, private horcruxes are 
unquestionably the most removed from federal deregulatory pressure, 
as private actors do not face pressure from the same voter 
constituencies. Yet private actors lack the same enforcement capacity 
as government agencies. Notably, they must establish standing to 
enforce citizen-suit provisions. The impacts of other kinds of public-
private actions such as reflexive law or management-based regulation 
may affect only a small number of firms, and thus may have a smaller 
impact than centralized federal regulations. Second, vertical horcruxes 
that allow states to adopt environmental regulatory programs have the 
potential to be incredibly significant in the face of withering federal 
action, especially with respect to climate change. Yet states cannot so 
easily address interstate pollution spillovers from other states, a 
primary rationale for uniform, federal rules.135 And in the case of the 
 
durability of climate change legislation or regulations is “not to protect the present at the expense 
of the future, but the precise opposite: to protect the future at the expense of the present”).  
 133. Cass R. Sunstein, Irreversible and Catastrophic, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 841, 841 (2006). 
 134. Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Architecture of Smart Intelligence: Structuring and 
Overseeing Agencies in the Post-9/11 World, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1655, 1657 (2006) (noting the 9/11 
Commission’s concerns about fragmentation, but arguing that “[u]nification can . . . have costs as 
well: for example, destroying needed safeguards and eliminating beneficial agency or committee 
competition,” and advocating a balance between redundancy and centralization). 
 135. See supra note 31.  
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states, the federal government can always exercise its authority under 
the Supremacy Clause to prohibit the states from acting at all.136 Thus, 
policy fragmentation limits the concentration of power both for 
positive and negative ends. 
III.  A RESEARCH AGENDA 
Further empirical research is needed to understand whether 
regulatory horcruxes actually withstand deregulatory pressures better 
than programs housed within a primary federal agency like the EPA in 
the environmental context, and which types are the most effective in 
this regard. In addition, further empirical research is needed to 
understand the impact of each type of horcrux on deliberative 
democracy, including whether they encourage broader framing of what 
could easily be understood as purely environmental programs. 
On the question of durability, to be sure, there has been significant 
political pushback against both vertical and horizontal horcruxes by 
deregulatory forces. For example, at the horizontal level, there have 
been efforts to block the SEC from enforcing its climate guidance, 
though the regulations and guidance currently remain in effect.137 On 
February 28, 2017, President Trump issued an executive order calling 
on the EPA and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to review the existing 
regulatory definition in the “Clean Water Rule” that had expanded 
federal jurisdiction, and to consider interpreting the term “navigable 
waters” more narrowly.138 On June 27, 2017, the EPA and the U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers signed the proposed rule that would limit 
federal jurisdiction, although there was no effort to amend the states’ 
power under Section 401 to issue water quality certificates.139 The 
White House’s proposed 2018 budget sought to eliminate the Energy 
Star program, and the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on 
Appropriations voted in the summer of 2017 to reduce the program’s 
 
 136. See supra note 56; see also infra note 144 (discussing the EPA’s intention to roll back 
vehicle emissions standards). 
 137. Mindy Lubber, SEC Climate Risk Disclosure Effort Under Serious Attack from Congress, 
FORBES (July 18, 2016, 11:21 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/mindylubber/2016/07/18/sec-
climate-risk-disclosure-effort-under-serious-attack-from-congress/#249f8cc33cc2 [https://perma.
cc/W3SE-AH3L].  
 138. Exec. Order No. 13,778, 82 Fed. Reg. 12,497 (Feb. 28, 2017). 
 139. Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Recodification of Pre-Existing Rules, 82 
Fed. Reg. 34,899 (proposed July 27, 2017) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328); see also supra note 
9 (noting CRA repeal of SEC rule obligation for firms in extractive industries). 
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funding by 40 percent.140 The fate of that program remains to be seen. 
Among vertical horcruxes, the most significant pushback has been 
talk of withdrawing or revoking the current California tailpipe 
emissions waiver under the Clean Air Act.141 California has received 
every waiver it has applied for under the Clean Air Act except one, 
when California first sought to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from 
motor vehicles.142 In 2009, however, the Obama administration granted 
this waiver. Subsequently, California and the EPA reached an 
agreement with the auto industry to adopt uniform rules for motor 
vehicle emissions, which were also harmonized with the DOT’s rules 
on new vehicle fleetwide fuel economy standards.143 Yet on April 2, 
2018, the EPA Administrator announced that the current uniform 
fleetwide standards are “not appropriate and should be revised.”144 
Although the Clean Air Act has no statutory provision governing 
revocation of a waiver, there is always the potential for the EPA simply 
to deny future waiver requests. The EPA’s April 2018 announcement 
stated that “cooperative federalism doesn’t mean that one state can 
dictate standards for the rest of the country,” and that the EPA looked 
forward to working with California, among others, on setting a uniform 
standard.145 As of the date of publication, California’s waiver remains 
intact. These horcruxes may not have been created with the issue of 
resisting deregulatory pressure in mind. However, whether horcruxes 
are more or less subject to deregulatory efforts than programs housed 
solely within the EPA, whether certain types of horcruxes (vertical, 
horizontal, private, shared, or external) are more or less subject to such 
pressures, and which are most likely to endure, are all questions that 
can be tested through empirical methods. 
 
 140. Emily Holden, White House Plans to ‘Close Out’ Energy Star, Other Programs, 
CLIMATEWIRE (Mar. 6, 2017), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060050976 [https://perma.cc/
45Y9-8RJ3]; Press Release, Appropriations Committee Approves Fiscal Year 2018 Interior and 
Environment Bill (July 18, 2017), https://appropriations.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?
DocumentID=395024 [https://perma.cc/5863-NV44]. 
 141. Robinson Meyer, The Coming Clean-Air War Between Trump and California, ATLANTIC 
(Mar. 6, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2017/03/trump-california-clean-air-
act-waiver-climate-change/518649 [https://perma.cc/6KHS-L28N]. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Jody Freeman, The Obama Administration’s National Auto Policy: Lessons from the 
“Car Deal,” 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 343, 344–45 (2015).  
 144. News Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA Administrator Pruitt: GHG Emissions 
Standards for Cars and Light Trucks Should Be Revised (Apr. 2, 2018), https://www.epa.gov/
newsreleases/epa-administrator-pruitt-ghg-emissions-standards-cars-and-light-trucks-should-be 
[https://perma.cc/46EQ-MT87]. 
 145. Id.  
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A unique question arises in the context of horizontal horcruxes, 
given the structural differences across federal agencies. If the primary 
federal agency and the secondary agency are both executive agencies, 
then the balance of power between Congress and the president in both 
creating and deregulating such programs is likely to be similar in 
nature. However, if the two agencies are of different design—for 
example, the primary agency is the EPA and the secondary agency is 
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) or the SEC, both 
of which are independent agencies, the balance of regulatory and 
deregulatory power may be different.146 In addition, different types of 
agencies may have different degrees of independent litigating 
authority, setting up potential enforcement conflicts in the case of 
shared horizontal horcruxes. Thus, further empirical research is 
warranted on whether embedding a horcrux in an executive or an 
independent agency renders it either more or less durable over time. 
On the question of whether horcruxes promote deliberative 
democracy, this too can be tested empirically. The hypothesis would be 
that those seeking to create horizontal horcruxes speak in terms of 
different values—beyond the environment—when advocating for such 
programs to be housed in federal agencies whose missions are focused 
on issues other than environmental protection. Whether such broader 
framing also exists for vertical and private horcruxes remains an open 
question. If programs that are framed more broadly have greater 
durability, this would also yield important insights for regulators 
designing programs in the future. 
CONCLUSION 
This systematic effort to understand the role of horcruxes makes 
three contributions to the literature on strategic regulatory design and 
on regulatory exit. First, it brings together insights from disparate 
literatures on federalism, interagency coordination, and collaborative 
governance, suggesting that there is significant value in comparing the 
different horcruxes along common normative metrics. A greater 
degree of fragmentation and distance from the center can harden such 
horcruxes from deregulatory pressures but can likewise weaken the 
ability of the regulatory program to achieve all of the same regulatory 
goals. Although horizontal horcruxes are likely to be the weakest at 
resisting deregulatory pressure focused on federal agencies, they will 
 
 146. Thanks to Ricky Revesz on this point.  
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be strongest at addressing interstate spillovers. And private horcruxes 
may be the strongest at resisting deregulatory pressure but may lack 
the scope and enforcement capacity of a centralized regulatory 
program. This leaves vertical horcruxes—regulatory programs 
embedded in whole or in part in the states—as perhaps attaining the 
best balance among the available options. 
Second, this framework demonstrates that demarcation lines—
like whether a statute fits into or outside of the “environmental law 
canon,”147 or whether a regulatory program is a form of “new 
governance”—are orthogonal to this analytical framework that 
anticipates deregulatory challenges. The Clean Water Act is 
unquestionably a canonical environmental law statute, not based on a 
new governance or modular approach to environmental regulation. It 
was adopted during the height of federal congressional action to 
protect the environment in the “environmental decade” of the 1970s.148 
Yet it nonetheless contains both a horizontal horcrux that shares power 
to preserve water quality between two federal agencies as well as a 
vertical horcrux that gives the states power to preserve water quality as 
a backstop when federal permitting decisions are insufficiently 
protective of human health and the environment. Likewise, the Clean 
Air Act’s delegation to the EPA to limit emissions from new motor 
vehicles is unquestionably part of the environmental canon and an 
example of top-down regulation rather than a form of new governance. 
Yet the California waiver provision is a significant vertical horcrux that 
has been crucial in the iterative development of motor vehicle 
emissions standards over time, and that now arguably serves as one of 
the most important backstops against federal deregulatory efforts to 
reduce the stringency of vehicle emissions standards.149 
Finally, although some might argue that vertical or private 
horcruxes are themselves equivalent to deregulation, this Article 
challenges that assumption. Vertical and private horcruxes can 
preserve much of a federal regulatory program’s substance even when 
the federal government wishes to exit. Given that the current 
administration has indicated its intent to pull out of the Paris 
 
 147. See Aagaard, supra note 18, at 1239, 1297 (arguing that embedding environmental 
programs into federal agencies other than the EPA can “offer an alternative model to the 
environmental law canon”); Freeman & Farber, supra note 32, at 798–803; Lobel, supra note 32, 
at 344–47. 
 148. See generally LETTIE M. WENNER, THE ENVIRONMENTAL DECADE IN COURT (1982) 
(discussing litigation over the major environmental legislation of the 1970s).  
 149. See supra note 68. 
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Agreement on Climate Change, many states and cities have declared 
their commitments to meet the Agreement’s goals through vertical 
horcruxes.150 Far from simply a fortuitous circumstance, the Paris 
Agreement expressly contemplated a role for participation and 
commitment by subnational governments.151 And the Clean Air Act 
permits these subfederal actors to take such actions without fear of 
preemption. Thus, regulatory horcruxes represent an antidote to 
regulatory exit when these external constituencies support the 
continuation of the regulatory program and remain publicly committed 
to its terms. 
Administrative law and empirical scholars should investigate the 
extent to which different forms of regulatory horcruxes follow these 
predicted patterns. Further empirical research in this area will yield 
insights for policymakers both designing new regulatory programs and 
amending existing ones. 
 
 150. See supra note 75. 
 151. See supra note 82.  
